• 838 Citations
1991 …2017
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Personal profile

Research Interests

Professor Swinkels' work has looked, among other things, at the question of how much of the value of an MBA can be traced to signaling versus education, how information is aggregated in auction and other market settings, the efficiency of auctions with many players, the design of incentive contracts with minimum wages, the design of procurement auctions when one vendor is preferred to another, and the evolutionary foundations for self control problems. His current work examines models with both adverse selection and moral hazard, and competition between principals who faces agents of unknown type.

Education/Academic qualification

Economics, PhD, Princeton University

… → 1990

Economics, BA, Queen's University Kingston

… → 1986

Research interests

  • Contract theory
  • Economic theory
  • Economics of organizations
  • Game theory
  • Information economics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics where Jeroen Swinkels is active. These topic labels come from the works of this person. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • 3 Similar Profiles
Auctions Business & Economics
Moral hazard Business & Economics
Private values Business & Economics
Payment Business & Economics
Costs Business & Economics
Principal-agent problem Business & Economics
Optimality Business & Economics
Randomization Business & Economics

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Research Output 1991 2017

  • 838 Citations
  • 28 Article
  • 2 Working paper
  • 1 Comment/debate
  • 1 Review article
6 Citations (Scopus)

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems

Kadan, O., Reny, P. J. & Swinkels, J. M., May 2017, In : Econometrica. 85, 3, p. 769-823 55 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Randomization
Principal-agent problem
Measurability
Adverse selection
Moral hazard

The No-Upward-Crossing Condition and the Moral Hazard Problem

Chade, H. & Swinkels, J. M., May 23 2016, 27 p.

Research output: Working paper

Moral Hazard
First-order
Exponential Family
Economics
Sufficient Conditions
2 Citations (Scopus)

Comparing first and second price auctions with asymmetric bidders

Mares, V. & Swinkels, J. M., Aug 2014, In : International Journal of Game Theory. 43, 3, p. 487-514 28 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

auction
Auctions
Handicap
Generalise
Asymmetric bidders
2 Citations (Scopus)

Existence and non-existence in the moral hazard problem

Moroni, S. & Swinkels, J., Jan 1 2014, In : Journal of Economic Theory. 150, 1, p. 668-682 15 p.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Moral hazard
Wealth
Costs
Utility function
Likelihood ratio

Existence of Optimal Mechanisms in Principal-Agent Problems

Kadan, O., Reny, P. J. & Swinkels, J. M., Feb 2014, 41 p.

Research output: Working paper

Randomization
Principal-agent problem
Measurability
Adverse selection
Moral hazard