A benchmark suite for evaluating caches' vulnerability to timing attacks

Shuwen Deng, Wenjie Xiong, Jakub Szefer

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

20 Scopus citations

Abstract

Based on improvements to an existing three-step model for cache timing-based attacks, this work presents 88 Strong types of theoretical timing-based vulnerabilities in processor caches. It also presents and implements a new benchmark suite that can be used to test if processor cache is vulnerable to one of the attacks. In total, there are 1094 automatically-generated test programs which cover the 88 Strong theoretical vulnerabilities. The benchmark suite generates the Cache Timing Vulnerability Score (CTVS) which can be used to evaluate how vulnerable a specific cache implementation is to different attacks. A smaller CTVS means the design is more secure. Evaluation is conducted on commodity Intel and AMD processors and shows how the differences in processor implementations can result in different types of attacks that they are vulnerable to. Further, the benchmarks and the CTVS can be used in simulation to help designers of new secure processors and caches evaluate their designs' susceptibility to cache timing-based attacks.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationASPLOS 2020 - 25th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Pages683-697
Number of pages15
ISBN (Electronic)9781450371025
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 9 2020
Event25th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, ASPLOS 2020 - Lausanne, Switzerland
Duration: Mar 16 2020Mar 20 2020

Publication series

NameInternational Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems - ASPLOS

Conference

Conference25th International Conference on Architectural Support for Programming Languages and Operating Systems, ASPLOS 2020
Country/TerritorySwitzerland
CityLausanne
Period3/16/203/20/20

Funding

We would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their valuable feedback. This work was supported by NSF grants 1651945 and 1813797, and through SRC award number 2844.001.

Keywords

  • Benchmark
  • Caches
  • Security
  • Timing attacks

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Information Systems
  • Hardware and Architecture

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