Abstract
We characterize elections that are simultaneously single-peaked and single-crossing (SPSC), by establishing a connection between this domain and that of minimally rich elections, i.e., elections where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter. Specifically, we show that an election is both single-peaked and single-crossing if and only if it can be obtained from a minimally rich single-crossing election by deleting voters.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 167-181 |
| Number of pages | 15 |
| Journal | Social Choice and Welfare |
| Volume | 54 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 2020 |
Funding
Part of this work was done while the first author was employed by Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and supported by National Research Foundation (Singapore) grant NRF2009-08; the first author was also supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant Number 639945 (ACCORD). The second author was supported by NCN Grants 2012/06/M/ST1/00358 and 2011/03/B/ST6/01393, and by AGH University Grant 11.11.230.015. The third author was supported by Polish National Science Center grant Preludium UMO-2013/09/N/ST6/03661 and by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: ?Normative Comparison of Multiwinner Election Rules?). The authors would like to thank the anonymous AAAI and Social Choice and Welfare reviewers for their very useful feedback. Part of this work was done while the first author was employed by Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and supported by National Research Foundation (Singapore) grant NRF2009-08; the first author was also supported by the European Research Council (ERC) under Grant Number 639945 (ACCORD). The second author was supported by NCN Grants 2012/06/M/ST1/00358 and 2011/03/B/ST6/01393, and by AGH University Grant 11.11.230.015. The third author was supported by Polish National Science Center grant Preludium UMO-2013/09/N/ST6/03661 and by the Foundation for Polish Science within the Homing programme (Project title: \u201CNormative Comparison of Multiwinner Election Rules\u201D). The authors would like to thank the anonymous AAAI and Social Choice and Welfare reviewers for their very useful feedback.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
- Economics and Econometrics