A Comment on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Alec Sandroni; Alvaro Sandroni

doi:10.1515/bejte-2019-0175

A Comment on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Alec Sandroni^*, Alvaro Sandroni

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow's desiderata).

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	347-354
Number of pages	8
Journal	B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
Volume	21
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0175
State	Published - Jan 1 2021

Keywords

Arrow
WARP
aggregators

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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10.1515/bejte-2019-0175

Cite this

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A Comment on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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