A Comment on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Alec Sandroni; Alvaro Sandroni

doi:10.1515/bejte-2019-0175

A Comment on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem

Alec Sandroni^*, Alvaro Sandroni

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Arrow (1950) famously showed the impossibility of aggregating individual preference orders into a social preference order (together with basic desiderata). This paper shows that it is possible to aggregate individual choice functions, that satisfy almost any condition weaker than WARP, into a social choice function that satisfy the same condition (and also Arrow's desiderata).

Original language	English (US)
Article number	20190175
Journal	B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2019-0175
State	Accepted/In press - 2020

Keywords

Arrow
WARP
aggregators

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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