A cooperation advantage for theory of mind in children and adults

Lily Tsoi; J. Kiley Hamlin; Adam Waytz; Andrew Scott Baron; Liane Lee Young

doi:10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.19

A cooperation advantage for theory of mind in children and adults

Lily Tsoi^*, J. Kiley Hamlin, Adam Waytz, Andrew Scott Baron, Liane Lee Young

^*Corresponding author for this work

Management and Organizations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Review article › peer-review

Abstract

Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	19-40
Number of pages	22
Journal	Social Cognition
Volume	39
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.19
State	Published - Feb 2021

Keywords

Cooperation
False belief
Social development

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Psychology
Developmental and Educational Psychology

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10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.19

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title = "A cooperation advantage for theory of mind in children and adults",

abstract = "Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.",

keywords = "Cooperation, False belief, Social development",

author = "Lily Tsoi and Hamlin, {J. Kiley} and Adam Waytz and Baron, {Andrew Scott} and Young, {Liane Lee}",

note = "Funding Information: We thank Catherine Kim, Elizabeth Kroll, Joshua Hirschfeld-Kroen, Kayla Soares, Michael Manalili, and Sophie Cooper for their assistance with data collection. We also thank members of the Boston College Morality Lab and anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article, the staff of the Living Lab and Science World at TELUS World of Science, and participating families. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (A.S.B.: # 435-2013-0286) and the National Science Foundation (L.Y. and A.W.: #1627157; graduate fellowship to L.T.: #1258923). For Figure 1, we adapted images from OpenMoji (License CC BY-SA 4.0). Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2021 Guilford Publications, Inc.",

year = "2021",

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doi = "10.1521/soco.2021.39.1.19",

language = "English (US)",

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AU - Tsoi, Lily

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AU - Baron, Andrew Scott

AU - Young, Liane Lee

N1 - Funding Information: We thank Catherine Kim, Elizabeth Kroll, Joshua Hirschfeld-Kroen, Kayla Soares, Michael Manalili, and Sophie Cooper for their assistance with data collection. We also thank members of the Boston College Morality Lab and anonymous reviewers for comments on earlier versions of this article, the staff of the Living Lab and Science World at TELUS World of Science, and participating families. This research was supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada (A.S.B.: # 435-2013-0286) and the National Science Foundation (L.Y. and A.W.: #1627157; graduate fellowship to L.T.: #1258923). For Figure 1, we adapted images from OpenMoji (License CC BY-SA 4.0). Publisher Copyright: © 2021 Guilford Publications, Inc.

PY - 2021/2

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N2 - Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

AB - Three studies test whether people engage in mental state reasoning or theory of mind (ToM) differently across two fundamental social contexts: cooperation and competition. Study 1 examines how children with an emerging understanding of false beliefs deploy ToM across these contexts. We find that young preschool children are better able to plant false beliefs in others' minds in a cooperative versus competitive context; this difference does not emerge for other cognitive capacities tested (e.g., executive functioning, memory). Studies 2a and 2b reveal the same systematic difference in adults' ToM for cooperation and competition, even after accounting for relevant predictors (e.g., preference for a task condition, feelings about deception). Together, these findings provide initial evidence for enhanced ToM for cooperation versus competition in early development and also adulthood.

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A cooperation advantage for theory of mind in children and adults

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Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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