A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts

Nabil Al-Najjar, Alvaro Sandroni*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review


We consider a contracting problem between a principal who wants to be informed about relevant stochastic processes and an expert who claims to know which process will generate the data. The data generating process is known to belong to a given class.We show that if the expert discounts the future and the set of allowed processes is convex then there is no screening contract that separates informed and uninformed experts. Our main proviso of convexity is immediately satisfied by any class of processes that can be characterized in a De Finetti-style result. This proviso is also satisfied when the expert is required to produce a prior over the relevant parameter space. Thus, the main difficulty in screening informed and uninformed experts has not yet been fully resolved.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)5-9
Number of pages5
JournalMathematical social sciences
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • General Social Sciences
  • General Psychology
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty


Dive into the research topics of 'A difficulty in the testing of strategic experts'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this