A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

Ehud Kalai; Andrew Postlewaite; John Roberts

doi:10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

Ehud Kalai^*, Andrew Postlewaite, John Roberts

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

37 Scopus citations

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	13-22
Number of pages	10
Journal	Journal of Economic Theory
Volume	20
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7
State	Published - Feb 1979

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

Cite this

@article{e7392336eac34a7d881b5411367095b1,

title = "A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations",

author = "Ehud Kalai and Andrew Postlewaite and John Roberts",

note = "Funding Information: * Support for Postlewaite{\textquoteright}s and Roberts{\textquoteright} research was provided by the National Science Foundation through grants to the University of Illinois and to Northwestern University. Kalai{\textquoteright}s research was supported by a grant from the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.",

year = "1979",

month = feb,

doi = "10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "20",

pages = "13--22",

journal = "Journal of Economic Theory",

issn = "0022-0531",

publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

AU - Kalai, Ehud

AU - Postlewaite, Andrew

AU - Roberts, John

N1 - Funding Information: * Support for Postlewaite’s and Roberts’ research was provided by the National Science Foundation through grants to the University of Illinois and to Northwestern University. Kalai’s research was supported by a grant from the Graduate School of Management, Northwestern University.

PY - 1979/2

Y1 - 1979/2

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=0002486171&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=0002486171&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

DO - 10.1016/0022-0531(79)90060-7

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:0002486171

SN - 0022-0531

VL - 20

SP - 13

EP - 22

JO - Journal of Economic Theory

JF - Journal of Economic Theory

IS - 1

ER -

A group incentive compatible mechanism yielding core allocations

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Cite this