A new argument for skepticism

Baron Reed*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

14 Scopus citations


The traditional argument for skepticism relies on a comparison between a normal subject and a subject in a skeptical scenario: because there is no relevant difference between them, neither has knowledge. Externalists respond by arguing that there is in fact a relevant difference-the normal subject is properly situated in her environment. I argue, however, that there is another sort of comparison available-one between a normal subject and a subject with a belief that is accidentally true-that makes possible a new argument for skepticism. Unlike the traditional form of skeptical argument, this new argument applies equally well to both internalist and externalist theories of knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)91-104
Number of pages14
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 2009


  • Externalism
  • Gettier problem
  • Knowledge
  • Skepticism

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy


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