A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games

E. Kalai; D. Samet; W. Stanford

doi:10.1007/BF01242860

A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games

E. Kalai^*, D. Samet, W. Stanford

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

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14 Scopus citations

Abstract

Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived under which the Tit-for-Tat strategy pair is a subgame perfect equilibrium in the standard discounted prisoner's dilemma. The sensitivity of the equilibrium to changes in the discount parameters is shown to be a common feature of all such nontrivial "reactive" equilibria. This appears to rule them out as reasonable solutions to the discounted prisoner's dilemma. In remarks, we indicate how these results can be extended to a fairly general class of games.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	177-186
Number of pages	10
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	17
Issue number	3
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01242860
State	Published - Sep 1 1988

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/BF01242860

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A note on reactive equilibria in the discounted prisoner's dilemma and associated games

Abstract

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