A one-shot bargaining problem

D. Anbar*, E. Kalai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a "one-shot bargaining".

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)13-18
Number of pages6
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume7
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 1978

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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