A one-shot bargaining problem

D. Anbar; E. Kalai

doi:10.1007/BF01763116

A one-shot bargaining problem

D. Anbar^*, E. Kalai

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

6 Scopus citations

Abstract

There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a "one-shot bargaining".

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	13-18
Number of pages	6
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	7
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01763116
State	Published - Mar 1 1978

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics

Access to Document

10.1007/BF01763116

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'A one-shot bargaining problem'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

@article{bbda5cd618d448b28adea4f689d10c02,

title = "A one-shot bargaining problem",

abstract = "There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a {"}one-shot bargaining{"}.",

author = "D. Anbar and E. Kalai",

year = "1978",

month = mar,

day = "1",

doi = "10.1007/BF01763116",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "7",

pages = "13--18",

journal = "International Journal of Game Theory",

issn = "0020-7276",

publisher = "Springer Verlag",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - A one-shot bargaining problem

AU - Anbar, D.

AU - Kalai, E.

PY - 1978/3/1

Y1 - 1978/3/1

N2 - There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a "one-shot bargaining".

AB - There are bargaining situations in which the parties cannot arrive at an agreement through negotiations but rather must make one irreversible claim which may or may not be fulfilled. In this paper we discuss a model for such a "one-shot bargaining".

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=34250283002&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=34250283002&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.1007/BF01763116

DO - 10.1007/BF01763116

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:34250283002

VL - 7

SP - 13

EP - 18

JO - International Journal of Game Theory

JF - International Journal of Game Theory

SN - 0020-7276

IS - 1

ER -