Abstract
We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 84-105 |
| Number of pages | 22 |
| Journal | Journal of Economic Theory |
| Volume | 102 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - 2002 |
Funding
1We thank the Associate Editor and an anonymous referree for helpful comments and suggestions. Gorkem Celik provided valuable research assistance. 2Financial support from NSF grant 9985462 is gratefully acknowledged.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics