A robust folk theorem for the prisoner's dilemma

Jeffrey C. Ely*, Juuso Välimäki

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

101 Scopus citations

Abstract

We prove the folk theorem for the Prisoner's dilemma using strategies that are robust to private monitoring. From this follows a limit folk theorem: when players are patient and monitoring is sufficiently accurate, (but private and possibly independent) any feasible individually rational payoff can be obtained in sequential equilibrium. The strategies used can be implemented by finite (randomizing) automata. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C72, C73, D82.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)84-105
Number of pages22
JournalJournal of Economic Theory
Volume102
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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