A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans; R. J. Weber

doi:10.1007/BF01774302

A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans^*, R. J. Weber

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

An example is given of a sequential auction in which, at equilibrium, the expected profit of an informed bidder may be strictly less than the expected profit of an uninformed bidder. This phenomenon is interpreted in terms of the internal game between a player's "types" which arises in a setting of incomplete information.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	123-127
Number of pages	5
Journal	International Journal of Game Theory
Volume	12
Issue number	2
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01774302
State	Published - Jun 1983

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Statistics and Probability
Mathematics (miscellaneous)
Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
Economics and Econometrics
Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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10.1007/BF01774302

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A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders

Abstract

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