A sequential auction involving asymmetrically-informed bidders

R. Engelbrecht-Wiggans*, R. J. Weber

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

An example is given of a sequential auction in which, at equilibrium, the expected profit of an informed bidder may be strictly less than the expected profit of an uninformed bidder. This phenomenon is interpreted in terms of the internal game between a player's "types" which arises in a setting of incomplete information.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)123-127
Number of pages5
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume12
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 1983

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ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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