A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

11 Scopus citations

Abstract

An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the game, all players have weakly dominant strategies. Moreover, if the two highest valuations are common knowledge, the second stage of the game is redundant, and the outcome is implemented in weakly dominant strategies.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)315-318
Number of pages4
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume42
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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