TY - JOUR
T1 - A simple and general solution to King Solomon's problem
AU - Olszewski, Wojciech
PY - 2003/2
Y1 - 2003/2
N2 - An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the game, all players have weakly dominant strategies. Moreover, if the two highest valuations are common knowledge, the second stage of the game is redundant, and the outcome is implemented in weakly dominant strategies.
AB - An indivisible object is to be allocated at no cost to the agent who values it most. We provide a simple two-stage mechanism, which implements the desired outcome when it is common knowledge that the agent who values the object most knows that. At each stage of the game, all players have weakly dominant strategies. Moreover, if the two highest valuations are common knowledge, the second stage of the game is redundant, and the outcome is implemented in weakly dominant strategies.
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U2 - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00560-2
DO - 10.1016/S0899-8256(02)00560-2
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0038287497
SN - 0899-8256
VL - 42
SP - 315
EP - 318
JO - Games and Economic Behavior
JF - Games and Economic Behavior
IS - 2
ER -