A simple exposition of belief-free equilibria in repeated games

Wojciech Olszewski*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Recently, there has been made a substantial progress in the analysis of repeated games with private monitoring. This progress began with introducing a new class of sequential equilibrium strategies, called belief-free equilibria, that can be analyzed using recursive techniques. The purpose of this paper is to explain the general method of constructing belief-free equilibria, and the limit (or bound) on the set of payoff vectors that can be achieved in these strategies in a way that should be easily accessible, even for those who do not pretend to be experts in repeated games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume3
Issue number58
StatePublished - Nov 12 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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