Absolutely stable games

Robert James Weber

doi:10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9

Absolutely stable games

Robert James Weber^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

3 Scopus citations

Abstract

Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and n-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least n - 1 players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	116-118
Number of pages	3
Journal	Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society
Volume	55
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9
State	Published - Feb 1976

Keywords

N-person games
Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Mathematics
Applied Mathematics

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10.1090/S0002-9939-1976-0406545-9

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title = "Absolutely stable games",

abstract = "Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and n-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least n - 1 players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.",

keywords = "N-person games, Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions",

author = "Weber, {Robert James}",

year = "1976",

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KW - N-person games

KW - Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions

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JO - Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society

JF - Proceedings of the American Mathematical Society

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Absolutely stable games

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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