Absolutely stable games

Robert James Weber*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

Absolutely stable games, in which every monotone chain of domination reduces to direct domination, are explicitly characterized. Simple games, and n-person games in which all minimal-vital coalitions contain at least n - 1 players, are seen to satisfy the characterization.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)116-118
Number of pages3
JournalProceedings of the American Mathematical Society
Volume55
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Feb 1976

Keywords

  • N-person games
  • Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Mathematics(all)
  • Applied Mathematics

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