Achieving cooperation under privacy concerns

Wioletta Dziuda, Ronen Gradwohl

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Two players choose whether to cooperate on a project. Each of them is endowed with some evidence, and if both possess a sufficient amount, then cooperation is profitable. In order to facilitate cooperation, the players reveal evidence to one another. However, some players are concerned about privacy, and so revelation of evidence that does not result in cooperation is costly. We show that in equilibrium evidence can be exchanged both incrementally and all at once, and identify conditions under which the different rates of evidence exchange are optimal.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)142-173
Number of pages32
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume7
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2015

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Achieving cooperation under privacy concerns'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this