Adjustment Dynamics and Rational Play in Games

Jeroen M. Swinkels*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

59 Scopus citations

Abstract

When a given strategic situation arises repeatedly, the possibility arises that equilibrium predictions can be justified by a dynamic adjustment process. We examine myopic adjustment dynamics, a class that includes replicator dynamics from evolutionary game theory, simple models of imitation, models of experimentation and adjustment, and some simple learning dynamics. We present a series of theorems showing conditions under which behavior that is asymptotically stable under some such dynamic is strategically stable in the sense of Kohlberg and Mertens. This behavior is thus as if the agents in the economy satisfied the extremely stringent assumptions that game theory traditionally makes about rationality and beliefs. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Number: C72.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)455-484
Number of pages30
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume5
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jul 1993

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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