Affiliation, integration, and information: Ownership incentives and industry structure

Thomas N. Hubbard*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

This paper presents theory and evidence on horizontal industry structure. At issue is the question: what makes industries necessarily fragmented? The theoretical model examines trade-offs associated with affiliation and integration, and how they are affected by the contracting environment. I show how contractual incompleteness can lead industries to be necessarily fragmented. I also show that contractual improvements will tend to lead to a greater concentration of brands, but whether they lead industries to be more or less concentrated depends on what becomes contractible. I then discuss the propositions generated by the model through a series of case study examples.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)201-227
Number of pages27
JournalJournal of Industrial Economics
Volume52
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 2004

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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