Agent-Based Models of Quadratic Voting

Jacob Kelter; Andreas Bugler; Uri Wilensky

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-83418-0_8

Agent-Based Models of Quadratic Voting

Jacob Kelter^*, Andreas Bugler, Uri Wilensky

^*Corresponding author for this work

School of Education and Social Policy

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

Abstract

A democracy must have a voting system, and there are multiple to choose from. None is perfect, each with strengths and limitations, depending on prevailing conditions. In this paper, we compare a recently proposed voting system, called quadratic voting (QV), with the more common majority rule system. There are many metrics that can be used to evaluate a voting system. A common one is to measure the “population welfare” resulting from a vote, defined as the sum of each individual’s welfare. An individual who benefited from the outcome has a positive welfare and one who was harmed has a negative welfare, with the magnitude determined by the amount of benefit or harm.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2020 Conference of The Computational Social Science Society of the Americas
Editors	Zining Yang, Elizabeth von Briesen
Publisher	Springer Science and Business Media B.V.
Pages	131-142
Number of pages	12
ISBN (Print)	9783030834173
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-83418-0_8
State	Published - 2021

Publication series

Name	Springer Proceedings in Complexity
ISSN (Print)	2213-8684
ISSN (Electronic)	2213-8692

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Applied Mathematics
Modeling and Simulation
Computer Science Applications

Access to Document

10.1007/978-3-030-83418-0_8

Cite this

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title = "Agent-Based Models of Quadratic Voting",

abstract = "A democracy must have a voting system, and there are multiple to choose from. None is perfect, each with strengths and limitations, depending on prevailing conditions. In this paper, we compare a recently proposed voting system, called quadratic voting (QV), with the more common majority rule system. There are many metrics that can be used to evaluate a voting system. A common one is to measure the “population welfare” resulting from a vote, defined as the sum of each individual{\textquoteright}s welfare. An individual who benefited from the outcome has a positive welfare and one who was harmed has a negative welfare, with the magnitude determined by the amount of benefit or harm.",

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Agent-Based Models of Quadratic Voting. / Kelter, Jacob; Bugler, Andreas; Wilensky, Uri.
Proceedings of the 2020 Conference of The Computational Social Science Society of the Americas. ed. / Zining Yang; Elizabeth von Briesen. Springer Science and Business Media B.V., 2021. p. 131-142 (Springer Proceedings in Complexity).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AB - A democracy must have a voting system, and there are multiple to choose from. None is perfect, each with strengths and limitations, depending on prevailing conditions. In this paper, we compare a recently proposed voting system, called quadratic voting (QV), with the more common majority rule system. There are many metrics that can be used to evaluate a voting system. A common one is to measure the “population welfare” resulting from a vote, defined as the sum of each individual’s welfare. An individual who benefited from the outcome has a positive welfare and one who was harmed has a negative welfare, with the magnitude determined by the amount of benefit or harm.

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Agent-Based Models of Quadratic Voting

Abstract

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