Aggregating with reason(s)

Fabrizio Cariani

doi:10.1007/s11229-012-0133-8

Aggregating with reason(s)

Fabrizio Cariani^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

4 Scopus citations

Abstract

Judgment aggregation is naturally applied to the modeling of collective attitudes. In the individual case, we represent agents as having not just beliefs, but also as supporting them with reasons. Can the Judgment Aggregation help model a concept of collective reason? I argue that the resources of the standard judgment aggregation framework are insufficiently general. I develop a generalization of the framework that improves along this dimension. In the new framework, new aggregation rules become available, as well as a natural account of collective reasons.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	3123-3147
Number of pages	25
Journal	Synthese
Volume	190
Issue number	15
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-012-0133-8
State	Published - Oct 2013

Funding

Acknowledgements I thank Branden Fitelson, Stephan Hartmann, Jeff Horty, Eric Pacuit, Gabriella Pigozzi, Sherri Roush, Jan Sprenger and an anonymous referee. Special thanks to Shyam Nair for delivering written comments on this paper at FEW 2011. I also thank for their feedback audiences at Tilburg University, FEW 2011, Workshop on Voting Methods and Judgment Aggregation (where I presented a descendent of this paper). Work on this paper was partly suported by Sherri Roush’s NSF project Fallibility and Revision in Science and Society, Award No. SES-0823418, whose support I gratefully acknowledge

Keywords

Collective belief
Judgment aggregation
Reasons

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Philosophy
General Social Sciences

Access to Document

10.1007/s11229-012-0133-8

Cite this

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abstract = "Judgment aggregation is naturally applied to the modeling of collective attitudes. In the individual case, we represent agents as having not just beliefs, but also as supporting them with reasons. Can the Judgment Aggregation help model a concept of collective reason? I argue that the resources of the standard judgment aggregation framework are insufficiently general. I develop a generalization of the framework that improves along this dimension. In the new framework, new aggregation rules become available, as well as a natural account of collective reasons.",

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Aggregating with reason(s)

Abstract

Funding

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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