Almost-dominant strategy implementation: Exchange economies

James Schummer

doi:10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002

Almost-dominant strategy implementation: Exchange economies

James Schummer^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

16 Scopus citations

Abstract

We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing "small" gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the relaxation.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	154-170
Number of pages	17
Journal	Games and Economic Behavior
Volume	48
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002
State	Published - Jul 2004

Keywords

Almost dominant strategy
Strategy-proofness
ε-dominant

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Finance
Economics and Econometrics

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10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002

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AB - We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing "small" gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstrating a type of non-robustness in previous impossibility results. When gains are measured with respect to a single good and preferences are linear, we characterize a particular rule as being the most equitable among all efficient rules satisfying the relaxation.

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KW - ε-dominant

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Almost-dominant strategy implementation: Exchange economies

Abstract

Keywords

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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