@article{0e55164a7f284f599199eb9232f44c6f,
title = "Ambiguous language and common priors",
abstract = "Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge.",
keywords = "Agree to disagree, Ambiguous language, Common prior, Harsanyi doctrine",
author = "Halpern, {Joseph Y.} and Willemien Kets",
note = "Funding Information: A preliminary version of this work appeared as “Ambiguous language and differences in beliefs” in the Principles of Knowledge Representation and Reasoning: Proceedings of the Thirteenth International Conference, 2012, pp. 329–338. We thank Moshe Vardi, two anonymous referees, and the Associate Editor for helpful comments. Halpern's work was supported in part by NSF grants IIS-0534064 , IIS-0812045 , IIS-0911036 , and CCF-1214844 , by AFOSR grants FA9550-08-1-0438 , FA9550-12-1-0040 , and FA9550-09-1-0266 , and by ARO grant W911NF-09-1-0281 . The work of Kets was supported in part by AFOSR grant FA9550-08-1-0389 . Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2015 Elsevier Inc.",
year = "2015",
month = mar,
day = "1",
doi = "10.1016/j.geb.2015.01.007",
language = "English (US)",
volume = "90",
pages = "171--180",
journal = "Games and Economic Behavior",
issn = "0899-8256",
publisher = "Academic Press Inc.",
}