Ambiguous language and common priors

Joseph Y. Halpern, Willemien Kets*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

Standard economic models cannot capture the fact that information is often ambiguous, and is interpreted in multiple ways. Using a framework that distinguishes between the language in which statements are made and the interpretation of statements, we demonstrate that, unlike in the case where there is no ambiguity, players may come to have different beliefs starting from a common prior, even if they have received exactly the same information, unless the information is common knowledge.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)171-180
Number of pages10
JournalGames and Economic Behavior
Volume90
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2015

Keywords

  • Agree to disagree
  • Ambiguous language
  • Common prior
  • Harsanyi doctrine

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics

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