An approach to bounded rationality

Eli Ben-Sasson*, Adam Tauman Kalai, Ehud Kalai

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

13 Scopus citations

Abstract

A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationAdvances in Neural Information Processing Systems 19 - Proceedings of the 2006 Conference
Pages145-152
Number of pages8
StatePublished - Dec 1 2007
Event20th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS 2006 - Vancouver, BC, Canada
Duration: Dec 4 2006Dec 7 2006

Publication series

NameAdvances in Neural Information Processing Systems
ISSN (Print)1049-5258

Other

Other20th Annual Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS 2006
CountryCanada
CityVancouver, BC
Period12/4/0612/7/06

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Information Systems
  • Signal Processing

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