@inproceedings{9171ea071cb54946ab8976f3036bcda8,

title = "An Approach to Bounded Rationality",

abstract = "A central question in game theory and artificial intelligence is how a rational agent should behave in a complex environment, given that it cannot perform unbounded computations. We study strategic aspects of this question by formulating a simple model of a game with additional costs (computational or otherwise) for each strategy. First we connect this to zero-sum games, proving a counter-intuitive generalization of the classic min-max theorem to zero-sum games with the addition of strategy costs. We then show that potential games with strategy costs remain potential games. Both zero-sum and potential games with strategy costs maintain a very appealing property: simple learning dynamics converge to equilibrium.",

author = "Eli Ben-Sasson and Kalai, {Adam Tauman} and Ehud Kalai",

note = "Funding Information: This work was funded in part by a U.S. NSF grant SES-0527656, a Landau Fellowship supported by the Taub and Shalom Foundations, a European Community International Reintegration Grant, an Alon Fellowship, ISF grant 679/06, and BSF grant 2004092. Part of this work was done while the first and second authors were at the Toyota Technological Institute at Chicago. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} NIPS 2006.All rights reserved; 19th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems, NIPS 2006 ; Conference date: 04-12-2006 Through 07-12-2006",

year = "2006",

language = "English (US)",

series = "NIPS 2006: Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Neural Information Processing Systems",

publisher = "MIT Press Journals",

pages = "145--152",

editor = "Bernhard Scholkopf and Platt, {John C.} and Thomas Hofmann",

booktitle = "NIPS 2006",

address = "United States",

}