An axiomatic theory of inductive inference

Luciano Pomatto, Alvaro Sandroni*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

This article develops an axiomatic theory of induction that speaks to the recent debate on Bayesian orgulity. It shows the exact principles associated with the belief that data can corroborate universal laws. We identify two types of disbelief about induction: skepticism that the existence of universal laws of nature can be determined empirically, and skepticism that the true law of nature, if it exists, can be successfully identified. We formalize and characterize these two dispositions toward induction by introducing novel axioms for subjective probabilities. We also relate these dispositions to the (controversial) axiom of σ-additivity.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)293-315
Number of pages23
JournalPhilosophy of Science
Volume85
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Apr 1 2018

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • History
  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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