An axiomatization of minimal curb sets

Mark Voorneveld, Willemien Kets, Henk Norde

Research output: Contribution to journalReview article

5 Scopus citations

Abstract

Norde et al. [Games Econ. Behav. 12 (1996) 219] proved that none of the equilibrium concepts in the literature on equilibrium selection in finite strategic games satisfying existence is consistent. A transition to set-valued solution concepts overcomes the inconsistency problem: there is a multiplicity of consistent set-valued solution concepts that satisfy nonemptiness and recommend utility maximization in one-player games. The minimal curb sets of Basu and Weibull [Econ. Letters 36 (1991) 141] constitute one such solution concept; this solution concept is axiomatized in this article.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)479-490
Number of pages12
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume33
Issue number4
DOIs
StatePublished - Nov 2005

Keywords

  • Consistency
  • Minimal curb set

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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