AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF BANKRUPTCY STATUTES

RONALD A. DYE*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

10 Scopus citations

Abstract

Personal bankruptcy statutes are analyzed as social insurance agreements. The risk‐sharing and incentive effects resulting from changes in bankruptcy laws are studied. It is shown that increasing the leniency of bankruptcy statutes may have unambiguous short‐term benefits to potential bankrupts, but may be detrimental in the long‐run.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)417-428
Number of pages12
JournalEconomic Inquiry
Volume24
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1986

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business, Management and Accounting(all)
  • Economics and Econometrics

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