An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers

Paul G. Straub*, J. Keith Murnighan

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

165 Scopus citations

Abstract

We designed two laboratory experiments to test popular hypotheses explaining the failure of subgame-perfect equilibrium models to explain behavior in ultimatum games. The first experiment varied information available to respondents. When respondents did not know the amount being divided, offerers offered (and respondents accepted) significantly lower offers than when the respondents knew the amount being divided. The second experiment replicated this result and also showed that people occasionally reject "free" money (i.e., offers with no strings attached). This evidence does not support earlier explanations for ultimatum anomalies and identifies conditions where subgame-perfect models apply.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)345-364
Number of pages20
JournalJournal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Volume27
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Aug 1995

Keywords

  • Bargaining
  • Experiments
  • Ultimatum games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Organizational Behavior and Human Resource Management

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'An experimental investigation of ultimatum games: information, fairness, expectations, and lowest acceptable offers'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

  • Cite this