Anti-reductionism and Expected Trust

Sanford C Goldberg

doi:10.1111/papq.12277

Anti-reductionism and Expected Trust

Sanford C Goldberg^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Philosophy

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

According to anti-reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection.

Original language	English (US)
Journal	Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12277
State	Published - Jan 1 2019

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Philosophy

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10.1111/papq.12277

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Anti-reductionism and Expected Trust

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