Anti-reductionism and Expected Trust

Sanford C Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

1 Scopus citations

Abstract

According to anti-reductionism, audiences have a default (but defeasible) epistemic entitlement to accept observed testimony. This paper explores the prospects of arguing from this premise to a conclusion in ethics, to the effect that speakers enjoy a default (but defeasible) moral entitlement to expect to be trusted when they testify. After proposing what I regard as the best attempt to link the two, I conclude that any argument from the one to the other will depend on a strong epistemological assumption that has not yet been discussed in this connection.

Original languageEnglish (US)
JournalPacific Philosophical Quarterly
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy

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