Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs

Taylor Hardin; Josiah Hester; Ryan Scott; Jacob Sorber; Patrick Proctor; David Kotz

Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs

Taylor Hardin, Josiah Hester, Ryan Scott, Jacob Sorber, Patrick Proctor, David Kotz

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

18 Scopus citations

Abstract

The proliferation of applications that handle sensitive user data on wearable platforms generates a critical need for embedded systems that offer strong security without sacrificing flexibility and long battery life. To secure sensitive information, such as health data, ultra-low-power wearables must isolate applications from each other and protect the underlying system from errant or malicious application code. These platforms typically use microcontrollers that lack sophisticated Memory Management Units (MMU). Some include a Memory Protection Unit (MPU), but current MPUs are inadequate to the task, leading platform developers to software-based memory-protection solutions. In this paper, we present our memory isolation technique, which leverages compiler inserted code and MPU-hardware support to achieve better runtime performance than software-only counterparts.

Original language	English (US)
Title of host publication	Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018
Publisher	USENIX Association
Pages	127-132
Number of pages	6
ISBN (Electronic)	9781939133021
ISBN (Print)	978-1939133021
State	Published - Jan 1 2020
Event	2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018 - Boston, United States Duration: Jul 11 2018 → Jul 13 2018

Publication series

Name	Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018

Conference

Conference	2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018
Country/Territory	United States
City	Boston
Period	7/11/18 → 7/13/18

Funding

This research results from a research program at the Institute for Security, Technology, and Society, supported by the National Science Foundation under award numbers CNS-1314281, CNS-1314342, CNS-1619970, and CNS-1619950. The views and conclusions contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the sponsors.

ASJC Scopus subject areas

General Computer Science

Cite this

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title = "Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs",

abstract = "The proliferation of applications that handle sensitive user data on wearable platforms generates a critical need for embedded systems that offer strong security without sacrificing flexibility and long battery life. To secure sensitive information, such as health data, ultra-low-power wearables must isolate applications from each other and protect the underlying system from errant or malicious application code. These platforms typically use microcontrollers that lack sophisticated Memory Management Units (MMU). Some include a Memory Protection Unit (MPU), but current MPUs are inadequate to the task, leading platform developers to software-based memory-protection solutions. In this paper, we present our memory isolation technique, which leverages compiler inserted code and MPU-hardware support to achieve better runtime performance than software-only counterparts.",

author = "Taylor Hardin and Josiah Hester and Ryan Scott and Jacob Sorber and Patrick Proctor and David Kotz",

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Hardin, T, Hester, J, Scott, R, Sorber, J, Proctor, P & Kotz, D 2020, Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. in Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018, USENIX Association, pp. 127-132, 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018, Boston, United States, 7/11/18.

Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. / Hardin, Taylor; Hester, Josiah; Scott, Ryan et al.
Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. USENIX Association, 2020. p. 127-132 (Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Conference contribution

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AU - Hester, Josiah

AU - Scott, Ryan

AU - Sorber, Jacob

AU - Proctor, Patrick

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Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs

Abstract

Publication series

Conference

Funding

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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