Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs

Taylor Hardin, Josiah Hester, Ryan Scott, Jacob Sorber, Patrick Proctor, David Kotz

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

1 Citation (Scopus)

Abstract

The proliferation of applications that handle sensitive user data on wearable platforms generates a critical need for embedded systems that offer strong security without sacrificing flexibility and long battery life. To secure sensitive information, such as health data, ultra-low-power wearables must isolate applications from each other and protect the underlying system from errant or malicious application code. These platforms typically use microcontrollers that lack sophisticated Memory Management Units (MMU). Some include a Memory Protection Unit (MPU), but current MPUs are inadequate to the task, leading platform developers to software-based memory-protection solutions. In this paper, we present our memory isolation technique, which leverages compiler inserted code and MPU-hardware support to achieve better runtime performance than software-only counterparts.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018
PublisherUSENIX Association
Pages127-132
Number of pages6
ISBN (Electronic)9781939133021
StatePublished - Jan 1 2020
Event2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018 - Boston, United States
Duration: Jul 11 2018Jul 13 2018

Publication series

NameProceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018

Conference

Conference2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018
CountryUnited States
CityBoston
Period7/11/187/13/18

Fingerprint

Data storage equipment
Memory management units
Microcontrollers
Embedded systems
Computer hardware
Health

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science(all)

Cite this

Hardin, T., Hester, J., Scott, R., Sorber, J., Proctor, P., & Kotz, D. (2020). Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. In Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018 (pp. 127-132). (Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018). USENIX Association.
Hardin, Taylor ; Hester, Josiah ; Scott, Ryan ; Sorber, Jacob ; Proctor, Patrick ; Kotz, David. / Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. USENIX Association, 2020. pp. 127-132 (Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018).
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Hardin, T, Hester, J, Scott, R, Sorber, J, Proctor, P & Kotz, D 2020, Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. in Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018, USENIX Association, pp. 127-132, 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018, Boston, United States, 7/11/18.

Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. / Hardin, Taylor; Hester, Josiah; Scott, Ryan; Sorber, Jacob; Proctor, Patrick; Kotz, David.

Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. USENIX Association, 2020. p. 127-132 (Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

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Hardin T, Hester J, Scott R, Sorber J, Proctor P, Kotz D. Application memory isolation on ultra-low-power MCUs. In Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018. USENIX Association. 2020. p. 127-132. (Proceedings of the 2018 USENIX Annual Technical Conference, USENIX ATC 2018).