Approximation algorithms for campaign management

Edith Elkind*, Piotr Faliszewski

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

62 Scopus citations

Abstract

We study electoral campaign management scenarios in which an external party can buy votes, i.e., pay the voters to promote its preferred candidate in their preference rankings. The external party's goal is to make its preferred candidate a winner while paying as little as possible. We describe a 2-approximation algorithm for this problem for a large class of electoral systems known as scoring rules. Our result holds even for weighted voters, and has applications for campaign management in commercial settings. We also give approximation algorithms for our problem for two Condorcet-consistent rules, namely, the Copeland rule and maximin.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationInternet and Network Economics - 6th International Workshop, WINE 2010, Proceedings
Pages473-482
Number of pages10
DOIs
StatePublished - 2010
Externally publishedYes
Event6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010 - Stanford, CA, United States
Duration: Dec 13 2010Dec 17 2010

Publication series

NameLecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)
Volume6484 LNCS
ISSN (Print)0302-9743
ISSN (Electronic)1611-3349

Conference

Conference6th International Workshop on Internet and Network Economics, WINE 2010
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityStanford, CA
Period12/13/1012/17/10

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Theoretical Computer Science
  • General Computer Science

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