Approximations to auctions of digital goods with share-averse bidders

Jinxiang Pei*, Diego Klabjan, Wei Xie

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider the case of a digital product for share-averse bidders, where the product can be sold to multiple buyers who experience some disutility from other firms or consumers owning the same product. We model the problem of selling a digital product to share-averse bidders as an auction and apply a Bayesian optimal mechanism design. We also design constant-approximation algorithms in the prior-free setting including both average- and worst-case analyses.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)128-138
Number of pages11
JournalElectronic Commerce Research and Applications
Volume13
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 2014

Keywords

  • Auction
  • Constant-approximation algorithms
  • Prior-free algorithms
  • Share-averse bidders

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Computer Science Applications
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Marketing
  • Management of Technology and Innovation

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