Arbitration of two-party disputes under ignorance

E. Kalai*, R. W. Rosenthal

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

25 Scopus citations

Abstract

When an arbitrator lacks complete information about the dispute in question, he may have to turn to the disputants themselves to provide information. If they know how the information is to be used, they may have incentives to hide the truth. By using the players reports as checks on each other, a completely ignorant arbitrator of a dispute between two completely informed players can induce truthful revelation in the sense that the truth is a Nash equilibrium of the game which the arbitrator's decision process imposes on the players. Such a scheme may be used in conjunction with any one from a class of functions which select Pareto-optimal, individually-rational outcomes in two-person normal-form games.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)65-72
Number of pages8
JournalInternational Journal of Game Theory
Volume7
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - Jun 1 1978

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Statistics and Probability
  • Mathematics (miscellaneous)
  • Social Sciences (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

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