Articulation compatibility in eliciting price bids

Alexander Chernev*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

7 Scopus citations


Do consumers prefer auctions that allow them to place more precise bids to auctions that accept less precise bids? Can consumers accurately estimate their need for price-elicitation precision? This research addresses these questions by applying the notion of compatibility to the relationship between consumers' bidding price uncertainty and the precision implied by the price-elicitation task. Data from four experiments show that when consumers are uncertain about the optimal bidding price, decision tasks requiring elicitation of precise bids lead to lower decision confidence, and vice versa. It is further shown that consumers display stronger preference for high-precision auctions, even though such auctions are associated with less confident pricing decisions.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)329-341
Number of pages13
JournalJournal of Consumer Research
Issue number3
StatePublished - Dec 2006
Externally publishedYes

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Business and International Management
  • Anthropology
  • Arts and Humanities (miscellaneous)
  • Economics and Econometrics
  • Marketing


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