Abstract
Assertion is widely regarded as an act associated with an epistemic position. To assert is to represent oneself as occupying this position and/or to be required to occupy this position. Within this approach, the most common view is that assertion is strong: the associated position is knowledge or certainty. But recent challenges to this common view present new data that are argued to be better explained by assertion being weak. Old data widely taken to support assertion being strong has also been challenged. This paper examines such challenges and finds them wanting. Far from diminishing the case for strong assertion, carefully considering new and old data reveals that assertion is as strong as ever.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 27-50 |
| Number of pages | 24 |
| Journal | Philosophical Studies |
| Volume | 180 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2023 |
Funding
We are grateful to Ben Holguín, Matt Mandelkern, Juan Ignacio Murillo Vargas, and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. This paper was written while both of us were independently supported by grants from The Honesty Project at Wake Forest University and the John Templeton Foundation. We are grateful for this support and note that the views expressed do not necessarily reflect the views of The Honesty Project, Wake Forest University, or the John Templeton Foundation.
Keywords
- Assertion
- Knowledge norm
- Speech acts
- Testimony
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Philosophy