Assignment of arrival slots

James Schummer*, Rakesh V. Vohra

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarantee a form of property rights. This is significant since these conditions were the motivation for introducing Compression a decade ago. We give an alternative mechanism that does satisfy these conditions. It has the flavor of Top Trading Cycle variants of Abdulkadiroǧlu and Sönmez (1999) and Pápai (2000) for related but distinct models. Finally, both mechanisms may fail another condition: the incentive to vacate unusable landing slots.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)164-185
Number of pages22
JournalAmerican Economic Journal: Microeconomics
Volume5
Issue number2
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2013

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics, Econometrics and Finance(all)

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