Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction

David Austen-Smith; William H. Riker

doi:10.2307/1963641

Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction

David Austen-Smith, William H. Riker

Managerial Economics, Decision Sciences and Operations

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

19 Scopus citations

Abstract

In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	243-245
Number of pages	3
Journal	American Political Science Review
Volume	84
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.2307/1963641
State	Published - Jan 1 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Sociology and Political Science
Political Science and International Relations

Access to Document

10.2307/1963641

Cite this

@article{36a2647f390c449b9f9fe5cde5dc2305,

title = "Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction",

abstract = "In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.",

author = "David Austen-Smith and Riker, {William H.}",

year = "1990",

month = jan,

day = "1",

doi = "10.2307/1963641",

language = "English (US)",

volume = "84",

pages = "243--245",

journal = "American Political Science Review",

issn = "0003-0554",

publisher = "Cambridge University Press",

number = "1",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation

T2 - A correction

AU - Austen-Smith, David

AU - Riker, William H.

PY - 1990/1/1

Y1 - 1990/1/1

N2 - In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.

AB - In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=84972159329&partnerID=8YFLogxK

UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=84972159329&partnerID=8YFLogxK

U2 - 10.2307/1963641

DO - 10.2307/1963641

M3 - Article

AN - SCOPUS:84972159329

SN - 0003-0554

VL - 84

SP - 243

EP - 245

JO - American Political Science Review

JF - American Political Science Review

IS - 1

ER -

Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Access to Document

Other files and links

Fingerprint

Cite this