Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction

David Austen-Smith, William H. Riker

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

18 Scopus citations


In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)243-245
Number of pages3
JournalAmerican Political Science Review
Issue number1
StatePublished - Jan 1 1990

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Sociology and Political Science
  • Political Science and International Relations


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