Abstract
In the September 1987 issue of this Review, we developed a game-theoretic model of committee or legislative decision making, showing the extent to which members may have incentives to share, or conceal, information. Because the formal analysis and statement of results for this model were in error, we offer this correction.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 243-245 |
| Number of pages | 3 |
| Journal | American Political Science Review |
| Volume | 84 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 1 1990 |
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Sociology and Political Science
- Political Science and International Relations
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Cite this
Austen-Smith, D., & Riker, W. H. (1990). Asymmetric information and the coherence of legislation: A correction. American Political Science Review, 84(1), 243-245. https://doi.org/10.2307/1963641