Asymptotic efficiency for discriminatory private value auctions

Jeroen M. Swinkels*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

31 Scopus citations

Abstract

We consider discriminatory auctions for multiple identical units of a good. Players have private values, possibly for multiple units. None of the usual assumptions about symmetry of players' distributions over values or symmetry of equilibrium play are made. Because of this, equilibria will typically involve inefficient allocations. Equilibria also become very difficult to solve for. Using an approach which does not depend on explicit equilibrium calculations we show that such auctions become arbitrarily close to efficient as the number of players, and possibly the number of objects, grows large, and provide a simple characterization of limit equilibria.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)509-528
Number of pages20
JournalReview of Economic Studies
Volume66
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 1 1999

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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