@inproceedings{7785bd87658e486a80384b95a11eaafa,
title = "Auctions with unique equilibria",
abstract = "We study Bayes-Nash equilibria in a large class of anonymous order-based auctions. These include the generalized first-price auction for allocating positions to bidders, e.g., for sponsored search. We show that when bidders' values are independent and identically distributed there is a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium; This equilibrium is symmetric and efficient. Importantly, our proof is simple and structurally revealing. This uniqueness result for the generalized first-price auction is in stark contrast to the generalized second-price auction where there may be no efficient equilibrium. This result suggests, e.g., that first-price payment semantics may have advantages over second-price payment semantics. Our results extend also to certain models of risk aversion.",
keywords = "All-pay auction, Bayes-nash equilibrium, First-price auction, Gfp, Gsp, Price of anarchy",
author = "Shuchi Chawla and Hartline, {Jason D}",
year = "2013",
doi = "10.1145/2492002.2483188",
language = "English (US)",
isbn = "9781450319621",
series = "Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
publisher = "Association for Computing Machinery",
pages = "181--195",
booktitle = "EC 2013 - Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce",
note = "14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013 ; Conference date: 16-06-2013 Through 20-06-2013",
}