Auctions with unique equilibria

Shuchi Chawla, Jason D Hartline

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contribution

38 Scopus citations


We study Bayes-Nash equilibria in a large class of anonymous order-based auctions. These include the generalized first-price auction for allocating positions to bidders, e.g., for sponsored search. We show that when bidders' values are independent and identically distributed there is a unique Bayes Nash equilibrium; This equilibrium is symmetric and efficient. Importantly, our proof is simple and structurally revealing. This uniqueness result for the generalized first-price auction is in stark contrast to the generalized second-price auction where there may be no efficient equilibrium. This result suggests, e.g., that first-price payment semantics may have advantages over second-price payment semantics. Our results extend also to certain models of risk aversion.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Title of host publicationEC 2013 - Proceedings of the 14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
PublisherAssociation for Computing Machinery
Number of pages15
ISBN (Print)9781450319621
StatePublished - 2013
Event14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013 - Philadelphia, PA, United States
Duration: Jun 16 2013Jun 20 2013

Publication series

NameProceedings of the ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce


Other14th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, EC 2013
Country/TerritoryUnited States
CityPhiladelphia, PA


  • All-pay auction
  • Bayes-nash equilibrium
  • First-price auction
  • Gfp
  • Gsp
  • Price of anarchy

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Software
  • Computer Networks and Communications
  • Computer Science Applications


Dive into the research topics of 'Auctions with unique equilibria'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this