Bad reputation

Jeffrey C. Ely, Juuso Välimäki

Research output: Contribution to journalReview articlepeer-review

125 Scopus citations


We construct a model where the reputational concern of the long-run player to look good in the current period results in the loss of all surplus. This is in contrast to the bulk of the literature on reputations where such considerations mitigate myopic incentive problems. We also show that in models where all parties have long-run objectives, such losses can be avoided.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)785-814
Number of pages30
JournalQuarterly Journal of Economics
Issue number3
StatePublished - Aug 2003

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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