Abstract
I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 31-53 |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Journal | American Economic Review |
| Volume | 107 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - Jan 2017 |
Funding
This research is supported through grants from the National Science Foundation.
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics