Beeps

Jeffrey C. Ely

doi:10.1257/aer.20150218

Beeps

Jeffrey C. Ely^*

^*Corresponding author for this work

Economics

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

65 Scopus citations

Abstract

I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.

Original language	English (US)
Pages (from-to)	31-53
Number of pages	23
Journal	American Economic Review
Volume	107
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20150218
State	Published - Jan 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

Economics and Econometrics

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10.1257/aer.20150218

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title = "Beeps",

abstract = "I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.",

author = "Ely, {Jeffrey C.}",

note = "Funding Information: This research is supported through grants from the National Science Foundation.",

year = "2017",

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pages = "31--53",

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AB - I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.

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DO - 10.1257/aer.20150218

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JO - American Economic Review

JF - American Economic Review

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Beeps

Abstract

ASJC Scopus subject areas

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