Beeps

Jeffrey C. Ely*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

28 Scopus citations

Abstract

I introduce and study dynamic persuasion mechanisms. A principal privately observes the evolution of a stochastic process and sends messages over time to an agent. The agent takes actions in each period based on her beliefs about the state of the process and the principal wishes to influence the agent's action. I characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and show how to derive it in applications. I then consider the extension to multiple agents where higher-order beliefs matter.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)31-53
Number of pages23
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume107
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Jan 2017

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Beeps'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this