Belief and its linguistic expression: Towards a belief box account of first-person authority

Sanford C. Goldberg*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)65-76
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Psychology
Volume15
Issue number1
DOIs
StatePublished - Mar 1 2002

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Applied Psychology
  • Philosophy

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