TY - JOUR
T1 - Belief and its linguistic expression
T2 - Towards a belief box account of first-person authority
AU - Goldberg, Sanford C.
PY - 2002/3/1
Y1 - 2002/3/1
N2 - In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
AB - In this paper I characterize the problem of first-person authority as it confronts the proponent of the belief box conception of belief, and I develop the groundwork for a belief box account of that authority. If acceptable, the belief box account calls into question (by undermining a popular motivation for) the thesis that first-person authority is not to be traced to a truth-tracking relation between first-person opinions themselves and the beliefs which they are about.
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U2 - 10.1080/09515080120109423
DO - 10.1080/09515080120109423
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:0036001736
SN - 0951-5089
VL - 15
SP - 65
EP - 76
JO - Philosophical Psychology
JF - Philosophical Psychology
IS - 1
ER -