Belief-free equilibria in repeated games

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77 Scopus citations


We introduce a class of strategies that generalizes examples constructed in two-player games under imperfect private monitoring. A sequential equilibrium is belief-free if, after every private history, each player's continuation strategy is optimal independently of his belief about his opponents' private histories. We provide a simple and sharp characterization of equilibrium payoffs using those strategies. While such strategies support a large set of payoffs, they are not rich enough to generate a folk theorem in most games besides the prisoner's dilemma, even when noise vanishes.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)377-415
Number of pages39
Issue number2
StatePublished - Mar 2005


  • Folk theorem
  • Private monitoring
  • Repeated games

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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