TY - JOUR
T1 - Bernoulli Factories and Black-box Reductions in Mechanism Design
AU - Dughmi, Shaddin
AU - Hartline, Jason
AU - Kleinberg, Robert D.
AU - Niazadeh, Rad
N1 - Funding Information:
The first author was supported by NSF CAREER Award CCF-1350900. The second author was supported in part by NSF grant CCF 1618502. The third author was partially supported by NSF grant CCF-1512964. Authors’ addresses: S. Dughmi, Department of Computer Science, University of Southern California, SAL 234, 941 Bloom Walk, Los Angeles, CA 90089; email: [email protected]; J. Hartline, Computer Science Department, Northwestern University, Seeley Mudd 3015, 2233 Tech Drive, IL 60208; email: [email protected]; R. D. Kleinberg, Department of Computer Science, Cornell University, Ithaca, 317 Gates Hall, NY 14853; email: [email protected]; R. Niazadeh, Chicago Booth School of Business, University of Chicago, HC-303, 5807 South Woodlawn Ave., Chicago, IL 60637; email: [email protected]. Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for components of this work owned by others than the author(s) must be honored. Abstracting with credit is permitted. To copy otherwise, or republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. Request permissions from [email protected]. © 2020 Copyright held by the owner/author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM. 0004-5411/2020/01-ART10 $15.00 https://doi.org/10.1145/3440988
Publisher Copyright:
© 2021 ACM.
PY - 2021/3
Y1 - 2021/3
N2 - We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution of the mechanism's output, which is typically #P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes exact incentive compatibility. We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the literature on Bernoulli Factories. In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping the bias of an "input coin"to that of an "output coin,"and the challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given only sample access to the input coin. This is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible reduction of Hartline et al. [18] exactly incentive compatible.
AB - We provide a polynomial time reduction from Bayesian incentive compatible mechanism design to Bayesian algorithm design for welfare maximization problems. Unlike prior results, our reduction achieves exact incentive compatibility for problems with multi-dimensional and continuous type spaces. The key technical barrier preventing exact incentive compatibility in prior black-box reductions is that repairing violations of incentive constraints requires understanding the distribution of the mechanism's output, which is typically #P-hard to compute. Reductions that instead estimate the output distribution by sampling inevitably suffer from sampling error, which typically precludes exact incentive compatibility. We overcome this barrier by employing and generalizing the computational model in the literature on Bernoulli Factories. In a Bernoulli factory problem, one is given a function mapping the bias of an "input coin"to that of an "output coin,"and the challenge is to efficiently simulate the output coin given only sample access to the input coin. This is the key ingredient in designing an incentive compatible mechanism for bipartite matching, which can be used to make the approximately incentive compatible reduction of Hartline et al. [18] exactly incentive compatible.
KW - Bayesian mechanism design
KW - bayesian incentive compatible (BIC) mechanisms
KW - bernoulli factories
KW - black-box reductions
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U2 - 10.1145/3440988
DO - 10.1145/3440988
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85103453528
SN - 0004-5411
VL - 68
JO - Journal of the ACM
JF - Journal of the ACM
IS - 2
M1 - 3440988
ER -