Beyond Words: Inarticulable Reasons and Reasonable Commitments

Kyla Ebels-Duggan*

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

2 Scopus citations

Abstract

We often come to value someone or something through experience of that person or thing. Call such an experience direct appreciation. When you appreciate something directly you may come to embrace a value that you did not previously grasp. Moreover, in a large and important subset of cases it seems you could not have fully appreciated that value, absent some such experience, merely by considering a report of the reasons or arguments that purport to justify your attitude. It follows that you will remain incapable of fully communicating the reasons for your valuing attitude to someone who lacks any such experience. Despite its ubiquity, this phenomenon goes missing in a great deal of contemporary work in ethics and political philosophy. To make sense of it we need an account of the standards governing our normative commitments that explains how we can have reasons for them without requiring articulacy about these reasons.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)623-641
Number of pages19
JournalPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research
Volume98
Issue number3
DOIs
StatePublished - May 2019

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Philosophy
  • History and Philosophy of Science

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