Control de limites: Autoritarismo subnacional en paises democraticos

Translated title of the contribution: Boundary control: Subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries

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3 Scopus citations


This paper explores dynamics of change and continuity in subnational (provincial) authoritarianism in nationally democratic regimes. Borrowing from theories of territorial politics, it provides a framework for analyzing the strategic context in which incumbent authoritarian elites and local and national opponents pursue strategies of territorial control and opposition. Subnational authoritarianism must be understood not as a local issue but as an outcome of broader dynamics of national territorial governance in democratic regimes. Conflicts between incumbents and opposition are played out across multiple territorial arenas in the national political system. In nationally democratic regimes, incumbent authoritarian elites will pursue three types of strategies across territorial arenas: the parochialization of power, the nationalization of influence, and the monopolization of national- subnational institutional linkages. Subnational democratization, when it occurs, will result from in tervention by actors in national political arenas. To this end, a distinction is made between two "modes" of subnational political change: "party- led" transitions and "center-led" transitions. The paper concludes with case studies of two recent conflicts over subnational democratization: the state of Oaxaca in Mexico, and the province of Santiago del Estero in Argentina.

Translated title of the contributionBoundary control: Subnational authoritarianism in democratic countries
Original languageSpanish
Pages (from-to)163-191
Number of pages29
JournalDesarrollo Economico
Issue number186
StatePublished - Jul 1 2007

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics

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