TY - JOUR
T1 - Buying allies
T2 - Payment practices in multilateral military coalition-building
AU - Henke, Marina E.
N1 - Funding Information:
142. African Union Mission in Somalia, “The African Union and the European Union Sign an Agreement for 165 Million Euros Funding Support for AMISOM” (Addis Ababa: AMISOM, October 16, 2015), http://amisom-au.org/2015/10/the-african-union-and-the-european-union-sign-an-agreement-for-165-million-euros-funding-support-for-amisom/. AMISOM has also received funding from AU member states, the AU Peace Fund, the UN Trust Fund for AMISOM, the UN Trust Fund for Somali Transitional Security Institutions, and UN assessed peacekeeping contributions. The bulk of cash has been provided by the United States and Europe, however. 143. Williams, “Joining AMISOM,” p. 174. 144. Fisher, “Managing Donor Perceptions,” p. 417; and Williams, “Joining AMISOM,” p. 175. AMISOM also gave the Ugandan defense forces an opportunity to repair their poor international reputation after widespread criticism of their interventions in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sudan/South Sudan. 145. Williams, “Joining AMISOM,” p. 174. 146. Security Assistance Monitor, “Data: Security Aid Pivot Table, 2007–2019” (Washington, D.C.: Security Assistance Monitor, n.d.), https://securityassistance.org/data/program/military/ Uganda/2007/2019/all/Global. 147. Nina Wilén, David Ambrosetti, and Gérard Birantamije, “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad, Sharing Power at Home: Burundi in Somalia,” Journal of Eastern African Studies, Vol. 9, No. 2 (March 2015), p. 308, doi.org/10.1080/17531055.2015.1018498. A conjuncture of interests drove Burundi’s decision to deploy, among them were ªnancial beneªts, training, national and international reputation, and building cohesion within a newly composed army. 148. Williams, “Joining AMISOM,” p. 177. 149. Wilén, Ambrosetti, and Birantamije, “Sending Peacekeepers Abroad, Sharing Power at Home,” p. 316.
Funding Information:
The author is grateful to Northwestern University and the European University Institute for financial support. For helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, the author thanks Karen Alter, Austin Carson, Jonathan Caverley, Erik Gartzke, Ian Hurd, Robert Keohane, Daniel Krcmaric, Ulrich Krotz, Charles Lipson, John Mearsheimer, Andrew Moravcsik, Stephen Nelson, Robert Pape, Paul Poast, Vincent Pouliot, William Reno, Andrew Roberts, Hendrik Spruyt, Paul Staniland, Paul Williams, and the anonymous reviewers.
Publisher Copyright:
© 2019 by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
PY - 2019/4/1
Y1 - 2019/4/1
N2 - Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations-African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
AB - Many countries serving in multilateral military coalitions are "paid" to do so, either in cash or in concessions relating to other international issues. An examination of hundreds of declassified archival sources as well as elite interviews relating to the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Gulf War, the Iraq War, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization operation in Afghanistan, the United Nations-African Union operation in Darfur, and the African Union operation in Somalia reveals that these payment practices follow a systematic pattern: pivotal states provide the means to cover such payments. These states reason that rewarding third parties to serve in multilateral coalitions holds important political benefits. Moreover, two distinct types of payment schemes exist: deployment subsidies and political side deals. Three types of states are most likely to receive such payments: (1) states that are inadequately resourced to deploy; (2) states that are perceived by the pivotal states as critical contributors to the coalition endeavor; and (3) opportunistic states that perceive a coalition deployment as an opportunity to negotiate a quid pro quo. These findings provide a novel perspective on what international burden sharing looks like in practice. Moreover, they raise important questions about the efficiency and effectiveness of such payment practices in multilateral military deployments.
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85065098431&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85065098431&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1162/ISEC_a_00345
DO - 10.1162/ISEC_a_00345
M3 - Article
AN - SCOPUS:85065098431
SN - 0162-2889
VL - 43
SP - 128
EP - 162
JO - International Security
JF - International Security
IS - 4
ER -
