Campaign spending regulation in a model of redistributive politics

Nicolas Sahuguet*, Nicola Persico

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

74 Scopus citations


We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)95-124
Number of pages30
JournalEconomic Theory
Issue number1
StatePublished - May 2006


  • Campaign spending regulation
  • Redistributive politics

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Economics and Econometrics


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