Abstract
We consider a model in which parties that differ in perceived valence choose how to allocate electoral promises (money, pork-barrel projects) among voters. The party perceived to be less valent has a greater incentive to "sell out" to a favored minority and completely expropriate a fraction of the electorate. By reducing the difference in perceived valence, campaign-finance regulations may reduce the extent of the expropriation and achieve a more equitable political outcome. We analyze various instruments of campaign-finance regulation from this perspective.
| Original language | English (US) |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 95-124 |
| Number of pages | 30 |
| Journal | Economic Theory |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 1 |
| DOIs | |
| State | Published - May 2006 |
Keywords
- Campaign spending regulation
- Redistributive politics
ASJC Scopus subject areas
- Economics and Econometrics