Capital structure, cost of capital, and voluntary disclosures

Jeremy Bertomeu*, Anne Beyer, Ronald A. Dye

*Corresponding author for this work

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

70 Scopus citations


This paper develops a model of financing that jointly determines a firm's capital structure, its voluntary disclosure policy, and its cost of capital. Investors who receive securities in return for supplying capital sometimes incur losses when they trade their securities with an informed trader. The firm's disclosure policy and the structure of its securities determine the information advantage of the informed trader and, hence, the size of investors' trading losses and the firm's cost of capital. We establish a hierarchy of optimal securities and disclosure policies that varies with the volatility of the firm's cash flows. Debt securities are often optimal, with the form of debt-risk-free, investment grade, or "junk"-varying with the firm's cash flow volatility. Though the model predicts a negative association between firms' cost of capital and the extent of information firms disclose, more expansive voluntary disclosure does not cause firms' cost of capital to decline. Mandatory disclosures alter firms' voluntary disclosures, their capital structure choices, and their cost of capital.

Original languageEnglish (US)
Pages (from-to)857-886
Number of pages30
JournalAccounting Review
Issue number3
StatePublished - May 2011


  • Capital structure
  • Cost of capital
  • Voluntary disclosures

ASJC Scopus subject areas

  • Accounting
  • Finance
  • Economics and Econometrics


Dive into the research topics of 'Capital structure, cost of capital, and voluntary disclosures'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this